Equity in the delivery of health care: some international comparisons by Doorslaer, E.K.A. (Eddy) van & Wagstaff, A. (Adam)
Journal of Health Economics I1 (1992) 389411. North-Holland 
Equity in the delivery of health care: 
Some international comparisons* 
Eddy van Doorslaer 
Erasmus University, Rotterdam, Netherlands 
Adam Wags tafP * 
Unioersity of Sussex, Brighton. UK 
Final version received July 1992 
This paper presents the results of an eight-country comparative study of equity in the delivery of 
health care. Equity is taken to mean that persons in equal need of health care should be treated 
the same, irrespective of their income. Two methods are used to investigate inequity: an index of 
inequity based on standardized expenditure shares, and a regression-based test. The results 
suggest that inequity exists in most of the eight countries, but that there is no simple one-to-one 
correspondence between a country’s delivery system and the degree to which persons in equal 
need are treated the same. 
1. Introduction 
In a companion paper in this issue [Wagstaff, Van Doorslaer et al. 
(1992)], we presented evidence on cross-country differences in health care 
financing systems and in the progressivity characteristics of these systems. 
We argued that analysing separately equity in the finance of health care and 
equity in the delivery of health care was warranted, given that academics and 
policy-makers alike appear to accept that different distributional principles 
ought to apply in each case. Broadly speaking, it appears to be accepted that 
health care ought to be financed according to ability to pay but delivered 
according to ‘need’. Hence our concern in the companion paper with 
progressivity in health care finance. 
Correspondence to: Adam Wagstaff, School of Social Sciences, Arts Building, University of 
Sussex, Falmer, Brighton BNl 9QN, UK. 
*We are grateful to the European Community’s COMAC-Health Services Research Com- 
mittee, which funded the coordination of the project whose results are reported in this paper, to 
Tony Culyer, Karen Davis, Jacques van der Gaag, Bob Haveman, Jeremy Hurst, Julian Le 
Grand, Jean-Pierre Poullier and Alan Williams for helpful comments on the research underlying 
this paper, and to Brigitte Kerbusch. Caroline Verboom and Jan van Emmerik for their 
assistance in the organization of the project. 
**And others. A full list of these authors and their affiliations appears in the appendix. 
0167-6296/92/SO6.00 0 1992-Elsevier Science Publishers B.V. All rights reserved 
390 E. aan Doorslaer et al., Equity in the delivery of health care 
In the present paper we examine equity in the delivery of health care, 
focussing on the horizontal version of the principle of distribution according 
to need: the requirement that persons in equal need ought to be treated the 
same. In common with most previous studies in this field, we search for 
violations of this principle that are related to income. We seek to establish, 
in other words, whether persons in equal need are treated the same 
irrespective of their income, or whether, as is often argued to be the case, the 
better-off receive more favourable treatment within each need category.’ We 
also seek to assess whether some countries come closer to achieving 
horizontal equity than others, and, if so, what features of health care systems 
seem to promote equity in the delivery of health care and which features 
seem to hinder its attainment. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the 
principal differences in the health care delivery system of the eight countries 
included in the present study which appear likely to influence the extent to 
which persons in equal need are treated the same. Section 3 considers the 
problems associated with measuring equity in the delivery of health care. 
Section 4 outlines the data sources and the variable definitions. Section 5 
presents the empirical results. The final section contains a summary and 
draws various conclusions. 
2. Equity and cross-country differences in health care delivery 
Our concern in this section is not to provide an exhaustive description of 
cross-country differences in health care delivery systems, but rather to outline 
the features which might be expected to influence the extent to which persons 
in equal need of health care are treated the same, irrespective of their income. 
It seems reasonable to suppose that the degree of income-related inequity 
associated with any health care delivery system is likely to depend in part on 
the extent to which the incomes of consumers affect their health-related 
behaviour and in part on the extent to which consumers’ incomes affect the 
behaviour of health care providers. 
The influence of income on the individual’s own behaviour is likely to be 
greater the larger are the various financial and non-financial costs associated 
with making the initial contact with the health care sector and with receiving 
medical care once the initial contact has been made. Such costs are 
sometimes termed ‘access costs’ [Le Grand (1982), Mooney (1983)], though 
the term is potentially confusing, since many of the costs associated with the 
receipt of health care are incurred after the individual has gained access to 
‘In a recent Note in this Journal, Mooney et al. (1991) argue that, by focussing on the 
treatment that people receive, rather than on their access to treatment, empirical work of the 
type reported in this paper ‘miss[es] the target’. For a defence of the treatment-based approach, 
see Culyer et al. (1992a). See also Mooney et al. (1992) and Culyer et al. (1992b). 
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the health care system. The costs in question include out-of-pocket payments, 
transport costs and the opportunity cost of time spent travelling and waiting. 
The magnitude of these access costs may well vary with income, as may the 
effects of such costs. 
Variation in insurance cover is one reason why access costs may them- 
selves vary across income groups. Some idea of within-country variation in 
insurance cover in each of the eight countries can be gleaned from table 1. In 
most countries insurance cover does not vary with income. In some 
countries, though, notably Ireland and the Netherlands, it is the better-off 
who have limited public cover. The U.S. stands out as the only country 
where a substantial proportion of persons on low incomes have no insurance 
cover whatsoever. Davis (1993) reports that in 1986, 37 million Americans 
(15% of the U.S. population) had no insurance cover. One-third had incomes 
below the official poverty line. All, however, were either insufficiently poor to 
qualify for Medicaid or failed to meet other entry criteria (most working-age 
men and adults without children are ineligible). The high out-of-pocket 
payments required to receive medical care appear to have deterred persons in 
this group from seeking medical care. Out-of-pocket payments may also vary 
across income groups (see table 1). Although this typically involves persons 
on lower incomes being exempted from public sector co-payments, there are 
countries (Denmark is an example) where the less well-off end up making 
larger out-of-pocket payments because they have not taken out insurance 
cover against co-payments. 
Other financial and non-financial barriers are also likely to be important 
and may also vary across income groups. The less well-off are likely to have 
to spend longer travelling to health care facilities than the well-off, being 
more reliant on public transport and tending to live in areas where health 
care resources are relatively scarce [Le Grand (1982)]. They are also likely to 
spend longer waiting in the waiting room, being less likely to have a 
telephone at home with which to make an appointment. The less well-off are 
also likely to spend longer on any waiting list, being less likely than the well- 
off to be able to ‘go private’, thereby bypassing any queue in the public 
sector. As is evident from table 1, sizeable proportions of the populations of 
Ireland, Italy, Spain and the U.K. have private insurance which generally 
ensures easier access. 
But even if utilization costs were invariant with respect to income, the 
effects of these costs would be likely to vary. Even if, for example, the 
nominal value of out-of-pocket payments were the same for everyone, the 
sacrifice in terms of forgone utility (and hence the deterrent effect) would 
probably be greater for the persons on low incomes than for persons towards 
the top of the income distribution. Evidence from the RAND health 
insurance experiment in the U.S. suggests that this is indeed the case. 
Newhouse, Manning and Morris (1981) remarked that ‘Our interim results 
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Country Year 
Denmark 1981 
Ireland 1987 
Netherlands 1987 
Spain 1987 
Switzerland 1981 
U.K. 1985 
U.S.A. 1984 
Table 2 
Anti-equity provider incentives. 
Ambulatory care 
None 
Higher fees for private patients 
than public patients 
GPs and specialists paid 
capitation for sick fund patients 
but FFS for private patients 
Specialists paid salary for public 
patients and FFS for private 
patients 
Physicians can charge higher fees 
for persons with 1st and 2nd class 
insurance cover 
None prior to 1991 reforms 
Less generous reimbursement for 
Medicaid patients than others 
Inpatient care 
None 
Hospitals paid prospective 
budgets for publicly insured but 
FFS for privately insured and 
publicly insured paying out-of- 
pocket 
Higher fees for private patients 
than public patients 
Private hospitals paid per diem by 
State and retrospectively by 
private insurance companies. 
Public sector physicians paid 
salary. 
Private sector physicians paid 
FFS 
None 
NHS doctors paid salary for NHS 
patients and FFS for private 
patients. Full-time NHS 
consultants limited in amount 
they can earn from private 
practice, but part-time not limited 
Less generous reimbursement for 
Medicaid natients than others 
indicate that the poor are not more responsive to cost sharing if the cost 
sharing is less for low income families, as in the experiment. However, our 
results do indicate that cost sharing unrelated ro income would differentially 
affect lower income families’ (p. 1505 emphasis added). 
The link between provider incentives and patient income is likely to be 
important in determining how close a health care system comes to achieving 
‘equal treatment for equal need’. The most obvious way that the income of a 
patient might influence provider behaviour is if the provider is paid 
differently depending on whether the patient is being treated publicly or 
privately. As is clear from table 2, in several countries some providers are 
paid in such a way that providing care to private patients is more profitable 
than providing care to public patients. Physicians, for example, may be paid 
on a fee-for-service basis for private patients, but by salary and/or capitation 
for public patients. Hospitals may receive a prospective budget for public 
patients but receive a fee for private patients. That such arrangements may 
well result in persons on different incomes but in equal need being treated 
differently is suggested by the work of Hooijmans and Rutten (1984). They 
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examined regional differences in the Netherlands in the hospital utilization of 
(high income) privately insured and (low income) publicly insured, and found 
that - after controlling for other factors - specialist density had a positive 
influence on private hospital use but no effect on public hospital use. They 
interpreted this finding to be a consequence of the fact that the fees for 
treating private patients were twice those for treating public patients. 
3. Measurement of inequity in the delivery of health care 
A moment’s reflection ought to reveal that a simple comparison of the 
average amount of treatment received by different income groups reveals 
nothing about whether or not persons in equal need are or are not being 
treated the same, since ‘need’ (typically proxied in empirical work by self- 
reported health status) tends to be correlated with income. Thus, for 
example, the fact that the well-off privately insured in the Netherlands tend 
to have fewer GP contacts than the less well-off publicly insured’ indicates 
nothing about any inequity in the Dutch health care delivery system, since 
the privately insured tend to be in better health than the publicly insured. 
This suggests that an assessment of equity in the delivery of health care 
ought to be based on treatment differentials adjusted for differences in ‘need’. 
3.1. Testing for inequity 
The tests of inequity employed in the project, and the reasons for adopting 
them rather than other tests, have been set out elsewhere in this Journal.3 
Here we present only a brief summary. 
Suppose there are two income groups, which we shall call ‘rich’ and ‘poor’, 
and two illness categories, ill and not ill. Let m, be the medical expenditure 
received by person i, and hi be a dummy taking a value of 1 if person i is ill 
and zero otherwise. Suppose for the moment that medical expenditures are 
generated according to the model 
cr,+&h,+~,~ if poor 
mi= 
% + Brhi + %i if rich, 
(1) 
where xp and tx, indicate the expected medical expenditures received by a 
%f. e.g. Van Vliet and Van de Ven (1985). 
%ee Wagstaff et al. (1991a). See also O’Donnell and Propper (1991a), Le Grand (1991), 
O’Donnell and Propper (1991b), and Wagstaff et al. (1991b). 
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poor non-sick person and a rich non-sick person, respectively, and CC, + j?, 
and a,+ fl, indicate the expected medical expenditures received by a poor 
sick person and a rich sick person, respectively. The hypothesis that persons 
in the same degree of need receive the same treatment, irrespective of their 
income, can be tested by testing the hypothesis that c(*=c(~ and PP=Pr. This 
can be done either by estimating separate equations for each income group 
or by using dummy income variables to construct an equivalent single 
equation model. Thus suppose that yi is a dummy variable taking a value of 
1 if person i is rich and 0 otherwise. Then eq. (1) is equivalent to the single 
equation model 
mi=7CO+7[1l)i+n2hi+n3yi’hi+Ui, (2) 
where rcO=clP, rrr =QC-C(~, rrZ=fiP and r~~=fi~-br.~ Estimating eq. (2) and 
testing the hypothesis that rcr = 7~~ =0 is equivalent to estimating eq. (1) and 
testing the hypothesis that CI,= CX, and pP=pr. 
The approach above can easily be extended to allow for several income 
groups and for several need indicators. Demographic factors, which have 
been ignored hitherto, can also be incorporated. Thus let Xi be a dummy 
variable taking a value of one if person i is elderly. Then a more plausible 
model to eq. (1) is: 
( 
CXp +pphi + 6pXi + Upi 
mi= 
CI,+jl,hi+d,Xj+U,i 
if poor 
if rich, 
so that a poor person who is both healthy and young is expected to receive 
an amount of expenditure equal to *rs while his elderly counterpart is 
expected to receive an amount of expenditure equal to cl,, + 6,. Rich and poor 
will be treated alike within all age-morbidity categories if and only if ux, = clP, 
br=&, and 6,=6,. 
The approach can also easily accommodate the fact that, in a typical 
distribution of medical expenditures, a large percentage of the population 
records zero utilization. An appropriate regression model in this case is a 
two-part model, the first part of which models the determinants of the 
individual’s decision to seek care, whilst the second models the determinants 
of the amount of care received, given that a contact has been made.5 The 
first part can be estimated as logit or probit models and the second part can 
then be estimated by OLS using only those individuals recording positive 
utilization, The hypothesis of no inequity can then be tested using a 
likelihood ratio test, on a two-part version of either eq. (1) or eq. (2), bearing 
4Eq. (2) is similar to the equation estimated by Puffer (1986) in his analysis of inequity in the 
delivery of health care in the U.K. and US. 
%ee, for example, Manning et al. (1981) and Van Vliet and Van de Ven (1985). 
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in mind that the log-likelihood for a two-part model is the sum of the 
log-likelihoods of the two parts of the model.” 
3.3. Quantzjjing inequity 
The discussion of the previous section was concerned with testing for 
inequity. It does not enable inequity to be quantified - something that is 
essential if cross-country comparisons are to be performed. The regression 
approach can, however, be extended to allow an index of inequity to be 
derived, providing one is prepared to accept a more general definition of 
horizontal equity.’ So far, equity has been taken to mean that the intercepts 
and slope coefficients in the medical utilization equations should be the same 
for all income groups, i.e., in the case of eq. (l), c(,= CC, and Pr=ljp. In other 
words a health care delivery system cannot be said to be horizontally 
equitable if the rich and poor are treated differently in any morbidity 
category. But what if the rich are treated favourably in one morbidity 
category (e.g. the non-sick category) but the poor are treated favourably in 
the other (e.g. the sick category)? A less restrictive definition of equity would 
regard such a situation as horizontally equitable on balance, providing any 
favourable treatment afforded to the poor amongst the sick was sufficiently 
large to offset the favourable treatment afforded to the rich amongst the non- 
sick. But how large does ‘sufficiently large’ have to be before one can say 
that, on balance, no inequity exists? 
The present study measures inequity by reference to standardized expendi- 
ture figures [cf. Van Vliet and Van de Ven (1985)J These values, which can 
be interpreted as the expenditures each income group would receive if it had 
the age distribution and the morbidity of the population as a whole, can be 
computed using the direct standardization method or regression analysis. If 
ordinary least squares (OLS) is used, the two methods are equivalent and the 
standardized expenditures of the rich and poor respectively in the model in 
eq. (1) can be defined as 
4 =a,+b,h 
(4) 
ml = a, + b,h, 
6Using eq. (1) one would estimate separate two-part models for each income group and then 
estimate the same model for the entire sample. Using eq. (2) one would estimate a two-part 
model (with interaction terms) for the entire sample, first with the relevant K’S unrestricted and 
then again with the same coefficients restricted to be zero. In both approaches twice the 
difference between the two models’ likelihood values is distributed with a chi-squared distribu- 
tion under the null hypothesis with as many degrees of freedom as there are parameters that are 
restricted in the restricted model [cf. e.g. Godfrey (1988)]. 
‘What follows draws heavily on WagstaB et al. (1991a). 
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Fig. I. Horizontal inequity in delivery of health care. 
where a, is the OLS estimate of CI,, b, is the OLS estimate of p,, and so on, 
and h is the sample mean of hi. 
We assess the extent of any inequity by looking at the difference between 
rn: and rni (see fig. 1). This difference can be written 
mr+ -m,C =(a,-~,) + h(b,- bp), 
(A) (B) 
In this decomposition, the degree of inequity affecting a given morbidity 
category is weighted by the fraction of the population in that category. Thus 
the entire population is affected by any differences in the (x’s, whilst only the 
sick (a fraction h of the population) are affected by a discrepancy in the /JJ’s. 
Saying that inequity exists if rn: #m;, and that it favours the rich if 
mr+ >m,+, seems reasonable. It is evidently more general than the earlier 
definition of inequity (viz. rr=up and pr= fir), but subsumes it as a special 
case: if M,= xP and Pr=/Ipr it follows automatically that (A)+(B) =O. That it 
is more general can be seen from fig. 2, which shows a situation where Z, < CC,, 
(inequity favours the poor amongst the non-sick) and fir>/3, (inequity 
favours the rich amongst the sick), and yet according to this more general 
definition of inequity there is, on balance, no inequity (i.e. rn: =m;). 
To obtain some idea of the extent of inequity one could, of course, simply 
compute standardized expenditure figures for each income group, using 
either the direct standardization method or regression analysis (ideally a two- 
part model), and then compare the values for the top and bottom groups. A 
more reliable approach is to plot a standardized expenditure concentration 
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Fig. 2. Horizontal equity in delivery of health care. 
0 100 
cumulative % of population 
Fig. 3. Standardized expenditure concentration curve. 
curve. This involves calculating standardized expenditure shares for each 
income group and then plotting the cumulative proportions of the popula- 
tion - ranked according to income - against their standardized expenditure 
shares. This is the curve labelled g,:, in fig. 3. If there is, on balance, inequity 
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favouring the rich, g& will lie below the diagonal (the case illustrated), 
whilst the opposite will be true if there is inequity favouring the poor. 
The extent of horizontal inequity can be measured by the concentration 
index corresponding to g,&,, denoted below by HIwvp [cf. Wagstaff et al. 
(1991a)l. This is defined as the ellipse-shaped area between g& and the 
diagonal, expressed as a proportion of the area under the diagonal. In the 
case where g&, lies above the diagonal (i.e. where there is inequity favouring 
the poor), the concentration index is defined as the negative of the ellipse- 
shaped area as a proportion of the area under the diagonal. Thus HI,,, is 
negative when there is inequity favouring the poor (the lower bound being 
- l), and is positive when there is inequity favouring the rich (the upper 
bound being + 1). 
It is worth noting that g& can cross the diagonal. In such cases the HIwvp 
index could register a value of zero even if the standardized expenditures 
vary across income groups. This would happen if the area between the 
concentration curve and the 45” line lying to the left of the crossover point 
were equal to the corresponding area to the right of the crossover. Such a 
situation might arise, for example, if the top and bottom income groups both 
have standardized expenditure figures that are above those of the middle 
groups. The implicit value judgement involved in using the HI,,, index in 
this case is that inequity favouring one income group can offset inequity 
favouring another. 
4. Data and variable definitions 
Analysing equity in the delivery of health care calls for data at the 
individual level on whichever variable is used to rank individuals (equivalent 
income in the present study), morbidity (our measure of ‘need’) and 
utilization. In most countries the obvious source of such data is a health 
interview survey (cf. table 3).8 Only Britain and Ireland lack such surveys; 
in both cases a more general-purpose household interview survey has been 
used. 
One shortcoming of health interview surveys (and a potential advantage of 
the more general-purpose surveys) is that their information on income and 
household structure can be somewhat limited. The Italian survey, for 
example, contained no information on the size and age structure of the 
‘Two other countries, France and Portugal, also participated in this comparative study of 
health care delivery systems. The results for these countries were excluded from the present 
paper, since the health indicators available were insuffkiently comparable to those used by the 
other eight countries. The French and Portuguese results are reported in Lachaud and Rochaix 
(1993) and Pereira and Pinto (1993). 
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Table 3 
Data sources for analysis of delivery systems. 
Institution 
conducting 
Country Abbr. Year Survey survey 
Denmark DK 1982,‘3 Danish Health Study Odense University 
Ireland IRL 1987 SIDPUSS ESRI 
Italy I 1985 Health Care Centro Europa 
Consumption Survey Ricerche 
Netherlands NL I98 I /2 Health Interview CBS 
survey 
Spain E I987 National Health INE 
Survey 
Switzerland CH 1981,‘2 SOMIPOPS and National Science 
SEVS surveys Foundation 
UK UK 1985 General Household cso 
Survey 
USA US 1980 NMCUES National Center for 
Health Statistics 
401 
Sample 
size 
(persons) 
3,153 
8,310 
2,197 
10,319 
16,770 
3,835 
25,000 
10,396 
respondent’s family, which meant that individuals in the Italian results are 
ranked by family income rather than equivalent income.’ 
Blaxter (1989) has proposed a useful schema for classifying morbidity 
measures according to the underlying conceptual model. She distinguishes 
between: (i) a medical model, in which ill-health is defined in terms of a 
deviation from physiological norms; (ii) a social-interactional or functional 
model, in which ill-health is defined in terms of a lack of ability to perform 
‘normal’ tasks or roles; and (iii) a subjective model, in which ill-health is 
defined in terms of the individual’s perception. She then suggests how the 
various morbidity measures that crop up in health interview surveys fit into 
this schema: questions about chronic illness are argued to derive from the 
medical model; questions asking whether the individual’s normal activities 
were affected by ill-health in the recall period are argued to derive from the 
functional model; questions on self-assessed health (e.g. ‘Do you consider 
your health to be good, quite good, or not good?) are argued to derive from 
the subjective model. Most countries’ surveys contain questions deriving 
from each of Blaxter’s models. There are, however, some exceptions, as is 
apparent from table 4. In the American survey, for example, there is no 
question such as ‘Do you have any long-standing health problem or chronic 
illness? All but the Irish survey contain information on functional health 
limitations and a question on self-assessed health along the lines ‘Do you 
consider your health in general to be excellent, good, fair or poor?. 
Utilization has been measured by imputed expenditures, as in Le Grand’s 
‘Different equivalence scales were used in each country’s results. 
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country Medical model 
Denmark 
Ireland 
Italy 
Netherlands 
Spain 
Switzerland 
U.K. 
U.S.A. 
Table 4 
Morbidity indicators available. 
Chronic illness (yes/no). 
No. of chronic illnesses 
Chronic illness (yes/no) 
Chronic illness (yes/no) 
Chronic illness (yes/no) 
List of 26 conditions 
later classified by 
principal components 
analysis into chronic 
and other 
Physician-diagnosed 
chronic condition 
(yes/no) 
Chronic illness (yes/no) 
Functional model 
No. restricted-activity 
days. 
No. bed-days 
Limiting chronic illness 
(yes/no). 
Restricted-activity days 
(yes/no) 
Restricted-activity days 
(yes/no) 
Limiting chronic illness 
(yes/no). 
Restricted-activity days 
(yes/no) 
Limiting chronic illness 
(yes/no) 
Limiting chronic illness 
(yes/no) 
Limiting chronic illness 
(yes/no) 
Subjective model 
Health defined as ‘not 
good’ if respondent 
disagreed with statement 
‘My health is excellent’ 
Three categories in self- 
assessment: good, quite 
good or not good. Latter 
used to define health ‘not 
good’ 
Four categories in self- 
assessment: good, 
sometimes good/ 
sometimes bad, fair, poor. 
Bottom 3 used to define 
health ‘not good’ 
Four categories in self- 
assessment: very good, 
good, fair, not good. 
Latter used to define 
health ‘not good’ 
Four categories in self- 
assessment: excellent, 
good, fair, poor. Bottom 
two used to define health 
‘not good’ 
Three categories in self- 
assessment: good, fairly 
good or not good. Latter 
used to define health ‘not 
good’ 
Four categories in self- 
assessment: excellent, 
good, fair, poor. Latter 
used to define health ‘not 
good’ 
(1978) study. Thus in contrast to studies such as that of Collins and Klein 
(1980) the present study takes into account not just whether an individual 
contacted the health care sector but also how much care was received. 
Moreover, in contrast to studies such as that of Puffer (1986) the present 
study includes not just primary care, but also specialist care and inpatient 
care. Dental care has been excluded on the grounds that the measures of 
need used do not, on the whole, reflect dental health. Medicines (prescribed 
and OTC) were also excluded, since several surveys did not include 
sufficiently detailed information to allow expenditures to be imputed. In 
arriving at overall imputed expenditure, GP visits, specialist visits and 
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Fig. 4. HI,,, indices for various morbidity indicators. 
inpatient days (or, in some cases, spells) have been weighted by their average 
cost. Except in situations where there was a clear difference between public 
and private sectors in the quality of care delivered (i.e. in the likely 
improvements in health status), the same unit cost was used for both sectors. 
5. Empirical results 
The empirical results reported here are based on variations of eq. (3) 
estimated on samples comprising adults only.” In all sets of results five 
income groups were used, and demographic variables were also entered in 
the equations (live age groups and a gender dummy). Where several 
morbidity indicators were available, results were obtained for each indicator 
separately, as well as for all morbidity indicators combined. 
5. I. Inequity indices 
Fig. 4 shows the values of the HI,,, index when self-assessed health and 
‘“The full results are reported in Van Doorslaer, WagstafT and Rutten (1993). 
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chronic sickness are used as indicators of need. The most striking feature of 
the chart is that in all but four cases where need is proxied by self-assessed 
health or chronic sickness, the index values are negative. Only in the Spanish 
case is the HI,,, index for the chronic indicator positive (and even then 
only marginally so), and only in the cases of Spain, the Netherlands and the 
U.K. is the index positive for the self-assessed health indicator.” Taken at 
face value the results in fig. 4 imply that if there is any inequity in the 
delivery of health care in these countries, it favours the less well-off. 
However, as we emphasize below, there is good reason to be wary about 
jumping to such a conclusion. Another noteworthy feature of fig. 4 is that the 
ranking of the six countries for which there is information on both morbidity 
indicators is virtually the same irrespective of which of the two indicators is 
chosen: (in descending order) Spain, the Netherlands, the U.K., Switzerland, 
Italy and then Denmark. 
One reason for not reading too much into the results in fig. 4 is that it 
may well be the case that inequalities in health exist amongst the chronically 
sick and amongst those who perceive their health to be not good [O’Donnell 
and Propper (1991a)l. Fig. 4 also reveals that in all countries the HI,,, 
index is larger when the self-assessed health and chronic sickness indicators 
are used simultaneously than when each is used alone. The implication is 
that failure to take into account the extent of pro-rich inequalities in health 
within morbidity categories tends to result in an underestimate of the extent 
of inequity in the delivery of health care that favours the well-off, or an 
overestimate of the extent to which it favours the less well-off. 
Indeed, it seems highly unlikely that all such inequality is taken into 
account simply by including self-assessed health and chronic sickness simul- 
taneously. Using data from the British Health and Lifestyle Survey, 
O’Donnell and Propper (1991a) find that amongst persons reporting chronic 
illness those in the lower income groups were more likely than their better- 
off counterparts to suffer from both more than one condition and relatively 
serious conditions, such as heart disease, angina and heart attack, and 
arthritis and rheumatism. By contrast those in the lower income groups were 
least likely to suffer from less serious complaints such as skin disease, eczema 
and dermatitis, and migraine and chronic headache. Similar results are 
reported for the Netherlands in Van Doorslaer et al. (1993). This suggests 
that future work in this area ought to incorporate information not simply on 
whether chronic illness is reported, but rather on the number and type of 
chronic conditions reported. 
Some results for Denmark reported in Christiansen (1993) indicate how 
“The fact that the index is positive for Spain when the chronic ill-health indicator is used 
alone may reflect the nature of the indicator. Unlike the chronic ill-health indicator used in the 
analyses of the other seven countries, the Spanish indicator is based on information covering 
only a handful of chronic conditions. 
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sensitive the HI,,, index is to the amount of information used in its 
calculations. When chronic sickness alone is used to calculate the index, its 
value is -0.072. When, in addition to chronic sickness, self-assessed health is 
included, the index rises to -0.055. Finally, when the number of chronic 
conditions is used (instead of simply whether or not the individual suffered 
from chronic sickness), and the number of activity-restricted days is included 
in addition to self-assessed health, the HI,,, index rises to -0.031. It seems 
highly likely in the light of the British and Dutch results noted above that if 
information on the type of chronic condition were to be included as well, the 
index would become larger and might even become positive. 
The upshot of all this is that the HI,,, indices in fig. 4 appear to 
understate the degree of any inequity favouring the well-off and overstate the 
degree of any inequity favouring the less well-off. Indeed, it is quite possible 
that the negative HI,,, values are simply due to a failure to take into 
account the full extent of inequalities in health across income groups. What 
is implied by the discussion above is that incorporating more detailed 
information on morbidity is most unlikely to cause any positive HI,,r 
values to become negative. This suggests that any inequity in the delivery of 
health care in Britain, Spain and the Netherlands does, indeed, favour the 
well-off, but that this may be true of other countries as well. 
5.2. Test results 
Another reason for not reading too much into the results reported in fig. 4 
is that the index values are small in absolute value. This suggests that any 
inequity might not be too large to worry about. A sufficient - but not 
necessary - condition for the HI,vP index to be zero is that the regression 
coefficients in models such as those in eqs. (2) and (4) are the same across all 
income groups. 
Rather than report the LR statistics for all the various specifications 
estimated on all eight datasets, table 5 reports the LR tests statistics and the 
associated HI,,, values only for the most general specification for which the 
LR statistic was reported. These are therefore the specifications that capture 
as much income-related variation in morbidity as possible. The table reports 
the LR test statistics for the first and second parts of the two-part model 
separately, as well as those for the combined model. 
Surprisingly, perhaps, the probability of seeking care - holding age, gender 
and need constant - does not appear to depend on income. One exception is 
Denmark, but this result may have been caused partly by inadequate income 
data. Income does, however, affect the amount of care received by those who 
use at least some health care: in all countries except Denmark and 
Switzerland the LR test statistic exceeds the 1% critical value of the chi- 
squared distribution. Our evidence suggests, therefore, that amongst those 
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who have entered the health care system, persons in equal need are not being 
treated equally. Indeed, the LR statistics for the two-part model as a whole 
(i.e. taking into account the effect of income on both the decision to seek 
care and the amount of resources received once contact has been made) 
suggest that inequity exists in the delivery of health care in all countries 
except the Netherlands and Switzerland. In these two countries the test 
statistic falls below the 1% critical value. In the cases of Denmark, Italy, 
Spain, the U.K. and the U.S., the LR test statistic exceeds the critical value, 
suggesting that overall in these countries there is unequal treatment for equal 
need and that this inequity is income-related, whilst in the Irish case the LR 
statistic is exactly equal to the 1% critical value. According to the HI,,, 
values, this inequity appears, on balance, to favour the better-off in Spain, 
the U.K. and the U.S. In the context of the U.S. it is worth noting that when 
the elderly are excluded from the sample, the LR test statistic is still 
extremely large but the HIwvp value indicates that this inequity appears to 
favour, on balance, the worse-off [cf. Gottschalk and Wolfe (1993)]. Whether 
the results obtained for other countries are similarly sensitive to the 
exclusion of the elderly - perhaps due to the inadequacy of income as a 
measure of economic well-being - remains to be seen. The HI,,, values, 
coupled with the LR test statistics, suggest that any inequity in Denmark 
and Italy favours the worse-off. However, the earlier comments about the 
sensitivity of the HI,,, values to the information included on need should 
be borne in mind. It is evident from the LR test results reported in table 5 
that the most decisive rejection of the null hypothesis of no income-related 
inequity is in the case of the U.S.” 
6. Summary and Conclusions 
The objective of this paper was to establish any cross-country differences 
in the extent to which persons in equal need of health care are treated the 
same, irrespective of their income. Two approaches were used. The tirst, 
which seeks to establish the extent of any inequity, entails an analysis of 
variations across income groups in standardized values of imputed medical 
expenditures. This approach asks, in effect, ‘how much would each income 
group have received on average if its age structure and morbidity levels had 
been the same as those of the population at large? If the better-off receive a 
larger expenditure having controlled for need and demographic factors, one 
concludes that inequity exists and it favours the better-off. The second 
approach, which seeks simply to test for inequity, involves a regression 
“This is despite the fact that the U.S. does not have the largest HI,,, value. The apparent 
paradox is explained by the fact that the U.S. standardized expenditure concentration curve 
crosses the diagonal. The LR test statistic for the 18-65 sample is also much higher than any of 
the LR values reported for any of the other countries. 
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analysis of imputed expenditures to test the hypothesis that the relationship 
between the amount of medical care received and the determinants of 
utilization (morbidity, age and gender) is the same for all income groups. 
This is equivalent to testing the hypothesis that imputed expenditures do not 
vary across income groups within each age-sex-morbidity category. 
The results obtained using the first method are somewhat sensitive to the 
choice of health indicators. When several health indicators are included 
simultaneously, the standardized medical expenditure distributions are less 
pro-poor, or more pro-rich, than when only one indicator is included at a 
time. This suggests that inequalities in morbidity exist within morbidity 
categories. This is taken into account by the multiple-indicator standardiza- 
tion results. What is not taken into account in these results is the fact that 
the worse off appear to be not only more likely to suffer from a chronic 
illness, but also more likely to suffer from several chronic illnesses at the 
same time, as well as from relatively serious illnesses. The inequity index 
values reported therefore almost certainly overstate any inequity favouring 
the less well-off and understate any inequity favouring the well-off. This 
implies that in countries where inequity favouring the well-off was detected 
and the null hypothesis of no inequity was rejected (Spain, the U.K. and the 
U.S.), pro-rich inequity almost certainly exists. A caveat here is that when the 
elderly are excluded from the U.S. sample, the inequity actually appears to 
favour the poor. However, as indicated above, it has not been possible yet to 
determine whether the results for the other countries are similarly sensitive to 
the exclusion of the over-65s. 
The regression tests, which were undertaken for the most general model 
specilications only, suggest that income-related inequity exists in live of the 
eight countries, notably Denmark, Italy, Spain, the U.K. and the U.S. The 
test statistic for the Irish sample was identical to the 99% critical value of the 
chi-squared distribution, whilst the test statistics for the Dutch and Swiss 
samples fell below the relevant critical values. The rejection of the null 
hypothesis of no inequity was decisive in the Danish sample and in both U.S. 
samples, but much less decisive in the British, Italian and Spanish samples. 
It would clearly be unwise, in view of the sensitivity of the index values to 
the amount of information used in its calculation, to attempt to draw firm 
conclusions about the extent to which any cross-country differences in 
inequity can be attributed to differences in health care delivery systems. 
Some tentative conclusions do, however, emerge. First, our results suggest 
strongly that persons in equal need in the U.S. are not treated the same, 
though - somewhat surprisingly ~ whether this inequity, on balance, favours 
the better-off or worse-off depends on whether one examines only the under- 
65s (in which case the inequity appears to favour, on balance, the worse-off) 
or the entire adult population (in which case the inequity favours, on 
balance, the better-off). Second, there appears to be inequity favouring the 
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well-off even in some countries where public cover is universal and compre- 
hensive, notably Spain and the U.K. In both countries this appears to be 
due, at least in part, to the above-average private expenditures of the better- 
off. Third, it appears that health care systems which do not have universal 
and comprehensive public cover are not necessarily those with the highest 
degree of inequity. Indeed, in both Switzerland and the Netherlands, where 
public cover is limited, the null hypothesis of no income-related inequity 
could not be rejected at the 1% level. Refinements to the empirical analysis in 
future work, including at least the use of richer information on need, is 
necessary to verify the robustness of these findings. 
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